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The high level of investment risk combined with the absence of collateral have made many venture 
capitalists to perform thorough evaluation process, establishing full information disclosure and 
implementing strict monitoring activities during the post investment stage. However, the absence of 
representatives in the investee firms’ boards gives great impact on all the venture capitalists’ 
endeavours to protect their investment interests, exposing them to the possibility of having 
management conflict and agency problem with their investee firms. As a result, this study 
investigates the moderating effect of nominee director on the relationship between venture 
capitalists and their investee firms in venture cooperation. Due to this, a cross-sectional study of 
questionnaire survey research design was conducted. The questionnaires were distributed through 
mailing procedure and data was generated from 35 Malaysian venture capital companies. Overall, 
the findings indicate that the nominee director insignificantly influence the relationship between 
venture capitalists and their investees in venture cooperation. Further results show that controlling 
mechanism through the placement of a nominee director failed to moderate the influence of Deal 
Origination and Screening (DOS), Evaluating Venture Proposal (EVP), Contracting and Deal 
Structuring (CDS), Monitoring and Post Investment Activities (MPI) and Risk Management (RM) on 
the management conflict. Based on the findings, it is inferred that venture relationship between 
venture capitalists and their investee firms are not influenced by the nominee director placed in the 
investee firms’ board. Thus, the study recommends that Malaysian venture capitalists, which include 
policy makers, to give more consideration to the controlling factor in order to reduce the possibility of 
conflict to occur in venture cooperation.  




One of the ultimate goals in any venture cooperation is to create a fruitful venture business. The 
likelihood of a venture cooperation to success is also depends on the continuous monitoring and 
good relationships established between the venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs. Therefore, it 
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is not surprise when most venture capitalists tend to play active monitoring roles during the post 
investment stage to improve the opportunity for their venture cooperation to success. 
 
Nevertheless, in the absence of perfect foresight, the venture capitalists face the prospect of 
incomplete compliance by the investee firms (Mohammad et al., 2014; Gimmon et al., 2011; 
Wendels et al., 2011; Sohaimi, 2004). In other words, the venture capitalists can only judge the 
effectiveness within which the investee firms complete their assigned tasks in an indirect way. 
Typically, the investee firms are not fully supervised and they have a measure of independence 
which tempts them to exploit the trust, i.e. by avoiding the risk and to shirk on effort. In addition, 
where informational asymmetries are significant between them, the investee firms are tempted to 
defect from the financial contracts because it is quite easy to manipulate strategic information to 
the venture capitalists about their venture businesses to their short-term ends (Mohammad et al., 
2014).  
 
It is cited that the absence of representatives in the investee firms’ board may give great impact to 
all the venture capitalists’ efforts in protecting their investment interests in their investee firms (Park 
& Steensma, 2012). Furthermore, the venture capitalists are assumed to deal with many other firms 
in their portfolio and have limited time to focus directly on one particular investee firm. Therefore, 
any attempt made by the venture capitalists to deal directly with a problematic investee firm 
requires them to commit their precious time, efforts and other priceless resources and may also 
have the possibility to end with unfavourable result (Gimmon et al., 2011). It is also cited that in any 
venture cooperation, conflict between cooperative parties seems to be inevitable and it is very 
difficult to avoid throughout the venture cooperation life. It is the same for the venture relationship 
between the venture capitalists and their investee firms. 
 
Therefore, one of the mechanisms utilized by many venture capitalists to overcome these issuesis by 
placing a nominee director in their investee firms’ board of directors. Besides becoming the venture 
capitalists’ representative, the nominee director placed is also expected to become the controlling 
factor which isresponsible to closely monitor and supervise the investee firms in various business 
aspects in ensuring that the venture businesses are managed accordingly and comply with the 
venture capitalists investment requirement. Within this context, the nominee director placed also is 
expected to facilitate the venture relationship between the venture capitalists and their investee 
firms.  
 
In this view, the placement of a nominee director in the investee firms’ board has raised the major 
question for this study; can the controlling factor through the placement of a nominee director 
moderate the relationship between the venture capitalists and their investee firms? 
 
In the light of above, this paper examines the moderating effect of a nominee director on the 
venture relationshipbetween the venture capitalists and their investee firms in venture capital 
financing in Malaysia. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In the last few decades, recommendations on how to increase board effectiveness, including 
reducing the conflict between the principal companies and their investee firms and corporate 
governance centred on the role of nominee directors, which are considered as one of the most 
important mechanisms to ensure corporate accountability (Boxer et al., 2012; Aggarwal, 2010; Bose, 
2009).  
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Basically, the term nominee director refers to directors who are not employees of the company they 
were assigned and do not participate in the day-to-day business operations (Fahlenbrach, 2010).  
Aggarwal (2010) further defined a nominee director as someone whose position is a mix of agents 
and trustees. Therefore, they have fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company or their 
nominator. These directors would be whistle-blowers ensuring the shareholders’ interests in the 
companies they were assigned are well protected. Their role was to provide independent views on 
corporate strategy, performance, resources, appointments and standards of conduct, though there 
were continuing concerns about whether there were sufficient suitably qualified individuals 
available to play what was deemed to be an important though still under-specified role (Froud et al., 
2008). 
 
Within the venture capital investment context, a nominee director will normally be placed by the 
venture capitalists in their investee firms’ board of directors for monitoring, supervising and 
reporting purposes once the venture capital investment has taken its place. This is part of their 
endeavours in minimizing the potential of agency problem and other unfavourable scenarios such as 
facing disastrous conflict with the investee firms which may affect the success of their venture 
businesses. Besides, it is one of the mechanisms that many people believe to have the ability in 
moderating the venture relationship between the venture capitalists and their investee firms. 
 
Venture capitalists are known as one of the main risk capital providers that offer financing to the 
potential firms that have sound business ideas but lack of capital to materialize them. Generally, 
their financing involves six sequential processes, at pre investment stage: i) deal origination and 
screening, ii) evaluating venture proposal, iii) contracting and deal structuring, and at post 
investment stage,  iv) monitoring and post investment activities, v) acquiring liquidity and vi) risk 
management (Klonowski, 2007; Sohaimi, 2004).These six sequential processes, which are also 
recognized as the managerial factors in the venture capital literatures,suggest that due to the 
riskiness of the venture businesses, a strategic approach is usually used by the venture capitalists 
and potential firms in managing the venture businesses across the fullventure capital financing 
process. In other words, the recognition of these various managerial factors by the venture 
capitalists and the investee firms are believed to be strategic and at the same time affect the 
performance of their venture businesses.Therefore, it is important to understand the managerial 
factors, whereby the nature of management conflict between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
is a consequence of their characteristics. 
 
In any venture cooperation,management conflict between cooperative parties seems to be 
inevitable and it is very difficult to avoid throughout the venture cooperation life. It is the same for 
the venture relationship between the venture capitalists and their investee firms. Within the context 
of venture capital cooperation, management conflict can be defined as the disagreement 
experienced by the venture capitalists with their investee firms in managing together their venture 
business. This term also covers agency conflicts or problems that are impossible to fully contract 
away by both parties. It is also cited that conflict between the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
negatively affect the venture outcomes (Yitshaki, 2008; Sohaimi, 2004; Higashide & Birley, 2002).  
 
The importance of developing cordial relationship between the venture capitalists and their 
investees were highlighted by many researchers in various academic studies.These studies include 
management conflict in venture capital financing in Malaysia (Mohammad et al., 2014), the inherent 
and actual conflicts between venture capitalists and venture backed firms (Yitshaki, 2008), 
management conflict in venture capital financing in the Malaysian Information, Communication and 
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Technology (ICT) sector (Sohaimi, 2004), the cognitive conflict (Higashide & Birley, 2002), the 
incentives to exit (Black & Gilson, 1998; Berglof, 1994), the exchanging of information and strategic 
information (Reid, 1998; Wright & Robbie, 1996), active monitoring (Hellmann, 1998; Timmons & 
Bygrave, 1986), the proper syndicating of financing (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994), the staging of actual 
financing (Sahlman, 1990) and the screening mechanisms employed (MacMillanet al., 1987). 
 
While such an emphasis is important, the studies does modestly to shed light on the 
controllingfactor rolesplayed by the nominee directorin venture cooperation in moderating the 
venture relationship between the venture capitalists and their investee firms.  
 
For instance, Mohammad et al. (2014) in his study on the management conflict between Malaysian 
venture capitalists and their investee firms found that venture evaluation process, venture 
contracting and deal structuring and venture monitoring and post investment activities were among 
the factors that contribute directly to the formation of management conflict between venture 
capitalists and their investeesin venture capital cooperation.However, the findings might not give 
aclear picture on the management conflict faced bythe Malaysian venture capitalists and their 
investees. This is because the study only focused on their venture relationshipwithout considering 
other factors that have the potential to facilitate the relationship towards reducing the management 
conflict in their venture cooperation. 
 
Therefore, to overcome this limitation, this study’s scope has been broadened by investigating the 
placement of a nominee director as controlling mechanism in venture capital cooperation between 
the Malaysian venture capitalists and the Malaysian entrepreneurs in various Malaysia economic 
sectors.  Thus, this study shall enrich the information and literature in this area. In line with the 
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investment activities, (v) acquiring liquidity and (vi) risk management. These are the factors that 
should be addressed by the venture capitalists in their investment since they are significantly related 
to the occurrence of management conflict in their venture cooperation. For instance, poor deal and 
screening coupled with the weak venture evaluation may result in the venture capitalists to fund 
incompetent firms which may have high potential to fail or defect in their venture cooperation. Also, 
incomprehensive deal structuring and weak venture financial contract may also create potentials for 
the investee firms to defect from the contract. Poor monitoring and weak risk management activities 
may result in the investee firms to be not fully supervised and finally may cause the venture 
capitalists to face the prospect of incomplete compliance by their investee firms in their venture 
cooperation. These are the factors that have high potentials to create management conflict in 
venture cooperation and hence are felt justified to be studied in the research framework as the 
independent variables.Additionally,the placement of a nominee director in any venture cooperation 
is cited in the literatures to be necessary in helping to facilitate the venture relationship established 
between the venture capitalists and their investees. This is the factor that has high potentials to 
moderate the venture relationship and hence is felt justified to be studied in the research 
framework as the moderator variable. Therefore, from the above discussions, the research 
framework for the study as presented in figure 1 should be acceptable. 
 
Based on these descriptions and also coupled with the above research framework, the following 
hypotheses are hereby formulated: 
 
H1: There is a significant difference between the managerial factors and management conflict.  
 
H2: Nominee director will moderate the relationship between the managerial factors and 
management conflict.  
 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Study Design 
 
The study is a cross sectional study of the questionnaire survey approach with a judgment sampling 
method where the Malaysian venture capital companies operating in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor 
were selected as the targeted population of this study. The sample respondents in this study 
comprise of venture capital investment personnel from executive level or higher in the selected 
venture capital companies. The venture capital companies were identified through the Malaysian 
Venture Capital Development Council (MVCDC) and Malaysia Venture Capital Association (MVCA) 
directories obtained through their website. A list of 102 venture capital companies was sorted out 
from the main list. However, only 49 respondents were qualified to participate in the study as the 
study samples. The remaining 64 respondents were found to be either inactive or inaccessible. Of 
these 49 potential respondents, only 44 respondents were willing to participate in the study. A total 
of 44 survey questionnaires were distributed through the email and post procedures. A total of 35 
completed questionnaires were returned filled, thus giving 79.55% response rate from the total 
sample size.  
 
3.2 Measurement of Variables 
 
To measure the variables, the study adopted the primary data collection questionnaire survey 
technique to achieve its objective. The survey questionnaire consists of twenty nine (25) closed 
ended and eleven (12) open-ended questions which were grouped into five parts. All variables in the 
416 
5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH (5TH ICBER 2014) PROCEEDING 
24 -25 MARCH 2014. PULLMAN HOTEL, KUCHING,SARAWAK, MALAYSIA 




study were measured using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree was used to measure the extent to which respondents agree or disagree to each of the 
statements in the questionnaire (Lucky & Minai, 2011; Minai & Lucky, 2011; Lucky & Minai, 2012).  
 
3.3 Questionnaire Description 
 
The independent variables (managerial factors) were measured using 93items while the dependent 
variable (management conflict) was measured using 9 items. The items used in this study were 
adapted from the various works of authors such as Yitshaki (2008) and Sohaimi (2004). Deal 
Origination and Screening (DOS) was measured using 4 items while the Evaluating Venture Proposal 
(EVP) was measured using 36 items. 5 items were used to measure Contracting and Deal Structuring 
(CDS), 21 items were used to measure Monitoring and Post Investment Activities (MPI), 6 items were 
used to measure Acquiring Liquidity (AL) and another 21 items were used to measure Risk 
Management (RM). The moderator variable (controlling mechanism) was measured using 18 items. 
In total, there were 121 items used to measure the independent variables, the dependent variable 
and the moderator variable in this study. The data for the descriptive analysis were gathered from 
12 open ended questions provided in the questionnaire.  
 
4. Data Analysis and Results  
 
4.1 Descriptive analysis result 
 
To summarize the profile of the respondents, a descriptive analysis was conducted using the SPSS 
version 19. The result indicates that out of the 35 respondents that participated in the study, the 
majority of them or 71.4%% of the respondents agreed that the placement of a nominee director in 
their investees’ board of directors is compulsory while another 17.1% of them said that the 
placement is not compulsory. Another 11.4% of the respondents said that the placement of a 
nominee director in their investees’ board depends on the venture capital funding amount. The 
result also indicates that all the respondents, or 100% of them require their investee to prepare the 
periodic reports. The result also indicates that the majority of the respondents or 68.6% of them 
often face problems and conflict with their investee firms. Another 17.1% respondents reported that 
they sometimes face problems with their investee firms while the other 14.3% reported that they 
rarely face problems with their investee firms. 
 
4.2 PLS Estimation results with SmartPLS 
 
Due to the conditions of insufficient, small sample size, explanation on endogenous construct, 
variance based methods and the violation of the basic assumptions, the use of Partial Least Square 
(PLS) becomes necessary in this study in analyzing the data (Zhang, 2009). Sharma and Kim (2012) 
noted that the use of PLS becomes necessary under conditions of insufficient sample size while Chin 
(1998) concurred that PLS is required for data analysis in a situation where there are many indicators 
and factors are involved. In this vain, Zhang (2009) noted that PLS can deal with both formative and 
reflective construct, which is the exact situation in this study. Thus, these situations reflect the 
present study and therefore, the study opted for the use of PLS for the data analysis. 
 
4.3 Measurement model 
 
For the model measurement, construct validity was conducted using the smartPLS with a two-step 
structural equation modeling (SEM) approach by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). Based on this, the 
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internal reliability and convergent validity for constructs were first conducted and then followed by 
the assessment of the discriminant validity of constructs as indicated in Table 1 and 2 respectively. 
For this, a minimum loading of 0.7 and above value was required for an item to be accepted for cross 
loadings and composite reliability as suggested by Hair et al. (2011).  
 
The result in Table 1 indicates that only 2 items coded as DOScandDOSf were retained for Deal 
Origination and Screening. 5 items coded EVP2a, EVP3ETb, EVP3MAa, EVP3PDa and EVP3PDc were 
also retained for Evaluating Venture Proposal. 2 items coded as CDSc and CDSd were retained for 
Contracting and Deal Structuring, while 2 items coded as MPI1a and MPI1e were retained for 
Monitoring and Post Investment activities. 5 items coded as RM1b, RM2ARc, RM2ARd, RM2MRd and 
RM2MRg were retained for Risk Management. 4 items coded as CM1c, CM1i, CM2c and CM3d were 
retained for Controlling Mechanism. 6 items coded as IAR2b, IAR2c, IAR2d, IAR2e, IAR2f and IAR2g 
were also retained for Management Conflict. One of the independent variables, Acquiring Liquidity 
and other items were removed due to the low loadings of less than 0.70.  ; a Composite Reliability 
(CR) = (square of the summation of the factor loadings)/[(square of the summation of the factor 
loadings) + (square of the summation of the error variances)]; b Average Variance Extracted (AVE) = 
(summation of the square of the factor loadings)/[(summation of the square of the factor loadings) + 
(summation of the error variances)]. 
 
For the average variance extracted (AVE), a minimum value of 0.5 is considered accepted (Bagozzi, 
Youjae & Phillips, 1991; Chin 1998; Fornell & Larcker 1981; Gefen, Straub & Boudreau, 2000) while 
the discriminant validity of constructs is determined by the average variance shared between each 
construct and its measures should exceed the variance shared between the construct and other 
constructs (Fornell & Larcker 1981).  Table 1 further indicates that all construct utilized in the study 
produced AVE values more than the suggested value of 0.5 by Bagozzi et al. (1991) and Chin (1998). 
 
Accordingly, the result also indicates that all construct yielded factor loading more than 0.7 as 
suggested by (Hair et al., 2011) while the values for composite reliability also indicated 0.7 and 
above as suggested (Bagozzi et al., 1991; Gefen et al., 2000), suggesting that the measurement 
model has achieved satisfactory internal reliability and convergent validity. 
 
Table 1: Measurement Model Result 
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Table 2 shows the result of the discriminant validity for all the theoretical constructs. It indicates that 
the correlation for each construct is less than the square root of the average variance extracted 
suggesting that the measurement model has achieved adequate discriminant validity (Fornell & 
Larcker 1981; Hair et al. 2011).  
 













The result of the SmartPLS structural model presented in Table 3 depicts the relationship between 
the exogenous and the endogenous constructs. It shows that there is a significant relationship 
between Contracting and Deal Structuring (CDS) and the management conflict    (ß = 0.193005; t-
Statistics = 1.694172). Further analysis also found that there is a significant relationship between 
Evaluating Venture Proposal (EVP) and management conflict (ß = -0.2833; t-Statistics = 1.60). The 
Monitoring and Post Investment (MPI) activities is also found to have a significant relationship with 
the management conflict (ß = 0.552515;   t-Statistics = 3.160644).  
 
However, the result indicates that there is no significant relationship between Deal Origination and 
Screening (DOS) with the management conflict (ß = 0.090018; t-Statistics = 0.846437). Further 
analysis also found that there is no significant relationship between Risk Management (RM) and 
management conflict (ß = 0.153538; t-Statistics = 1.183482). The overall R
2
 is found to be 0.857095, 
which implies that the exogenous variables; deal origination and screening, evaluating venture 
proposal, contracting and deal structuring, monitoring and post investment activities, risk 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CDS 0.895039       
CM 0.498594 0.860586      
DOS 0.076353 0.568163 0.768807     
EVP 0.447095 0.859494 0.409669 0.821552    
MC 0.510645 0.856755 0.634348 0.674287 0.76529   
MPI 0.393784 0.842862 0.615725 0.782508 0.565454 0.86774  
RM 0.139383 0.437594 0.516538 0.338696 0.477198 0.311371 0.837497 
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Table 3:Path Coefficients and Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses Relationship Beta Standard 
Error 
t -Statistics Decision 
H1a DOS -> MC 0.090018 0.106349 0.846437 Not 
supported 
H1b EVP -> MC -0.283300 0.178968 1.582961 Supported 
H1c CDS -> MC 0.193005 0.113923 1.694172 Supported 
H1d MPI -> MC 0.552515 0.174811 3.160644 Supported 
H1f RM -> MC 0.153538 0.129734 1.183482 Not 
Supported 
P<0.10 
4.4 The Moderating Effects 
To test the second hypothesis (H2) on the moderating effects of controlling mechanism (CM) on the 
relationship between the independent variables (deal origination and screening, evaluating venture 
proposal, contracting and deal structuring, monitoring and post investmentactivities and risk 
management) and the dependent variable (management conflict), the SmartPLS analysis was also 
conducted. The overall result indicates that controlling mechanism did not moderate the 
relationship between all the independent variables (deal origination and screening, evaluating 
venture proposal, contracting and deal structuring, monitoring and post investment activities and 
risk management) and the dependent variable (management conflict). Further details on these 
testing results are shown in Table 4.  
Besides, Figure 2 also gives additional information on the moderating effects of controlling 
mechanism (CM) on the relationship between the independent variables (deal origination and 
screening, evaluating venture proposal, contracting and deal structuring, monitoring and post 
investment activities and risk management) and the dependent variable (management conflict). 














CDS -> MC 0.175400 0.202381 0.161922 0.161922 1.083240 
CDS * CM -> 
MC 
-0.174346 -0.148130 0.222490 0.222490 0.783616 
CM -> MC 0.516424 0.475952 0.411818 0.411818 1.254011 
DOS -> MC 0.013484 0.026310 0.176935 0.176935 0.076211 
DOS * CM -> 
MC 
0.051124 0.031229 0.184505 0.184505 0.277085 
EVP -> MC -0.305329 -0.243761 0.294560 0.294560 1.036559 
EVP * CM -> 
MC 
-0.091752 0.043728 0.313468 0.313468 0.292701 
MPI -> MC 0.470089 0.396749 0.349639 0.349639 1.344499 
MPI * CM -> 
MC 
-0.056407 -0.009936 0.359630 0.359630 0.156848 
RM -> MC -0.055308 0.014785 0.220788 0.220788 0.250503 
RM * CM -> -0.235116 -0.017596 0.309017 0.309017 0.760851 
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Figure 2: The Moderating Effects of Controlling Mechanism (CM) on the Relationship Between the 
Independent Variables (deal origination and screening, evaluating venture proposal, 
contracting and deal structuring, monitoring and post investment activities and risk 
management) and the Dependent Variable (management conflict) 
 
5. Discussions and Conclusions 
 
The major objective of this study is to investigate the moderating effect of a controlling mechanism 
through the placement of a nominee director on the venture relationship between the venture 
capitalists and their investees in their venture cooperation. In other words, the study examined on 
how the placement of a nominee director in venture backed firms moderates the relationship 
between the venture capitalists and their investee firms in their venture cooperation. At the same 
time, the study also attempt to address the factors contributing to theoccurrence of management 
conflict between the Malaysian venture capitalists and their investee firms operating in various 
Malaysian economic sectors.  
 
In realising this objective, the study utilised the SmartPLS to analyse the data generated from 35 
venture capital companies operating in Malaysia.Overall, the result demonstrates that managerial 
factors namely evaluating venture proposal, contracting and deal structuring and monitoring and 
post investment activities significantly influence management conflict, while on the contrary, 
managerial factors namely deal origination and screening and risk management do not significantly 
influence management conflict. This result is consistent with previous studies by Sohaimi (2004) and 
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Yitshaki (2008) who affirmed that there was a significant relationship between these managerial 
factors and the management conflict in venture cooperation.  
 
Further result shows that the placement of a nominee director in the investee firms as the control 
mechanism failedto moderate the venture relationship between the venture capitalists and their 
investees. Therefore, it can be inferred that the placement of a nominee director in the investee 
firms by the venture capitalists for monitoring and supervising purposes is insufficientto facilitate the 
venture relationship between both contracted parties.  
 
The hypothesis testing result for the moderator effect on the relationship between venture 
capitalists and their investee firms further indicates that the placement of a nominee director in the 
investee firms’ board of directors gives little or no impact on the relationship between the venture 
capitalists and their investee firms. Consequently, this shall affect the venture capitalists’ overall 
efforts to reduce the management conflict in their venture cooperation when the nominee director 
placed is unable to facilitate and moderate the relationship between the contracted parties.  
 
The inability of the nominee director placed to moderate the relationship between the venture 
capitalists and their investee firms couldbe further explained by analysing this issue from 
directorship perspective. According to this, the investee firms’ board of directors are consist of 
several differentindividual directors, in which some of them may also representingothershareholders 
or principals. Hence, the decisions made by the board members are normally based on collectively 
basis, where every single decision proposed by the individual directors is thoroughly evaluated and 
assessed by the board members before the board could come out with theirultimate business 
decision.Therefore, the placement of a single nominee director in the investee firms’ board of 
directors might not be capable of totally influence the decisions made by the overall board 
members, as each decision proposed by a single director is seen as a unique and not comprehensive. 
 
We therefore argued based on our findings that evaluating venture proposal, contracting and deal 
structuring and monitoring and post investment activities are crucial in determining the occurrence 
of management conflict in venture cooperation. Therefore, Malaysian venture capitalists involve in 
the venture capital investment should address these factors if they want to minimize the conflict 
potentials between them and their investees in their venture cooperation. This is very critical since 
the cordial relationship between them and their investee firms is necessary in helping both parties 
to increase the opportunity for the venture cooperation to success.  
 
We also argued that the placement of a nominee director in the investee firms’ board of directors is 
unable to moderate the venture relationship established between the venture capitalists and their 
investees. Hence, the Malaysian venture capitalists need another superior mechanism or other 
additional mechanisms to complement the nominee director roles in helping them to successfully 
moderate and facilitate their venture relationship and at the same time reduce the potential for the  
management conflict to occur between them and their investees in their venture cooperation. 
 
Without doubt, the findings obtained in this study have several implications. It has shed more insight 
on the need to understand the factors that contribute to the formation of management conflict in 
venture cooperation as well as the importance in addressing these factors towards mitigating the 
management conflict which can negatively affect the venture outcome. It has informed the 
Malaysian venture capitalists to be more focused on their investment practice with particular 
attention to venture evaluation process, contractual and deal structuring and venture monitoring 
activities. Besides, the findings also have shed more insight on the need to understand the 
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responsibilities and jurisdiction of a nominee director in venture cooperation. Through this 
understanding, efforts can be taken to allow the duties and responsibilities of the nominee director 
to suit their jurisdiction to enable their roles to be effectively played.The major limitation for this 
study is data. The data for this study is limited due to the small population size of the Malaysian 
venture capital companies. Therefore, we recommend that this study should be replicated with a 
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